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REVIEW OF THE U.S. ARMY'S CURRENT COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE USING THE ALGERIAN WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
The Algerian War of National Liberation is a classic counter-insurgency operation. 1 A rebellion arising from within the Algerian population was transformed into an insurgency by the incorporation of an armed political campaign. Underlying this rebellion were socio-economic factors that typically galvanize any political campaign (e.g., distribution of wealth, participation in political intercourse). The catalyst for rebellion and resistance was a popular desire to end the French occupation of Algeria. While the indigenous population of Algeria was overwhelmingly Islamic, religious ideology was not a primary mobilizing factor behind the rebellion, unlike the current insurgencies faced in the War on Terrorism.
This paper reviews the French Army experience during the Algerian War of National
Liberation ("War of National Liberation") in the context of the most recent U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency. This review will focus on the French Army's counterinsurgency techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) using a framework that is drawn from the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency doctrine established in Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22, adopted in October 2004.
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THESIS
Among the counterinsurgencies of the last 50 years, the French experience in Algeria is highly relevant to evaluation of current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine to be followed in the War on Terrorism (WOT). Immediate similarities can be found between the counterinsurgency in Algeria and the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarities include terrain, the TTPs of the current insurgents, and their underlying motivations and ideologies. Additionally, this was a major counterinsurgency involving a Western suppression of a rebellion arising in an Islamic population.
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ROADMAP
Because many readers will have limited familiarity with the War of National Liberation, the paper provides a brief overview of the conflict. Subsequently, current U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency is introduced. Using this doctrine as a framework, the TTPs used by the French Army are reviewed and then analyzed. This analysis seeks to establish two critical points: (1) Whether the current Army doctrine is validated by the French Army's experience in Algeria; and (2) Whether the French Army's experience can be applied to the current campaigns in the WOT.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
After almost 130 years of foreign control, Algeria was among the last of the France's colonies to achieve independence. Many of the colonies in Africa peacefully achieved independence after the European colonial powers recognized that independence movements had achieved "critical mass." Such was not the case in Algeria. Independence from France was achieved only after a brutal war that spanned most the 1950's and produced a staggering number of deaths: estimated casualties range between 250,000 and 1,000,000. 4 Algeria was initially occupied by France in 1830 in conjunction with a drive to eradicate piracy from the Mediterranean. Many diverse economic, political, and legal factors then fueled the aggressive French colonization of Algeria. 5 Hundreds of thousands of French settlers, often referred to as either "colons" -the term used in this paper -or "pied noir" (the "black feet"), moved to Algeria during the colonial period, eventually accounting for ten percent of Algeria's population. 6 The
French settlers became increasingly powerful economically, but never assimilated into the indigenous population. The "settler aristocracy" in Algeria dictated French policy in the colony with a primary focus on preserving their economic and political control. The colonists' actions were obvious and fostered a strong movement for independence.
Assistance to France by Algerian colonials (especially the widespread military service by indigenous people in "colonial" units) in both World War I and II fostered an expectation that their fidelity would be rewarded with political and economic restructuring to increase inclusiveness. While limited concessions were made, they were insufficient to assuage the pent-up demands of the indigenous people of Algeria. An extremely violent French response to a terrorist incident that occurred on VE Day further fanned the flames of discord. 18 To accomplish these objectives, the military works with local civil authorities, the populace, and NGOs to "bridge the gap" between the government and the people, satisfy the aspirations of the people, and create the perception of a responsive and capable government.
In this way the root causes of the rebellion are potentially addressed and the openings for subversion hopefully diminished. 19 Populace and resource control operates on the basis that an insurgency is both rooted in the grievances of the people and draws its sustainability from them. Put another way, the insurgents' primary target is the people. Consequently, counterinsurgency efforts must work to separate the insurgent from the people and the resources they can provide. 20 In order to break this linkage, Army CMO doctrine establishes that the military, working with civil law enforcement organizations, will conduct operations sequentially (by phases), of five broadly defined types, to control the population and resources. 21 • Securing and defending the area internally and externally.
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• Organizing for law enforcement. 23 This type of operation reflects the overarching concept that civil control measures are in fact very similar to police functions.
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• Executing cordon and search operations, to include securing key government facilities.
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• Screening and documenting the population (e.g., performing a detailed census).
26
• Performing public administration. 27 The primary objective of counterinsurgency combat operations is to neutralize the insurgents and, together with population and resource control measures, establish a secure environment. To accomplish this objective, doctrine expects that military forces, both of the host nation and a supporting country, will work closely with civil law enforcement authorities to conduct a wide range of offensive and defensive actions. 28 Among the specifically identified operations are pursuits, ambushes, operations to clear and hold terrain, and the defense of population centers (as opposed to terrain). One aspect of counterinsurgency operations, given minimal treatment in this doctrinal publication but explored in depth in this paper, is the use of paramilitaries and militias. won the military battle. 31 The materials available on this conflict are vast, but key aspects can be readily placed into the doctrinal framework of CMO, combat operations, and PSYOPS established by FM 3-07.22.
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
French CMO during the War of National Liberation were numerous and varied, but can be best grouped into a framework of military civic actions conducted by special teams, populace control measures, and ancillary CMO measures.
Military Civic Action Conducted by The Sections Administratives Specialisees
From the start of operations in Algeria, senior officers of the French Army, acting upon the direction of the in-country French civil leaders, initiated an active set of civic action programs as the centerpiece of CMO. To address basic deficiencies in human services faced by the indigenous population in remote rural areas, the French Army established civil affairs teams called Sections Administratives Specialisees (SAS). Civil affairs officers and noncommissioned officers of the SAS were drawn from the best soldiers in the army. 32 To prepare these soldiers for their mission, the French Army established a comprehensive counterinsurgency-training program for all ranks, branches, and services in Algeria. 33 The mission of the SAS was to solve the problem of "under-administration" in areas populated only by Muslims with little exposure to French government and culture. 34 Small SAS teams provided education, agricultural improvements, infrastructure (e.g., roads), and health care to these indigenous people. 35 Between 1956 and 1957, the SAS trebled the number of primary schools providing education to the indigenous population. 36 In the later stages of the conflict, the coordination with military operations was readily apparent, with SAS teams being immediately inserted into areas recaptured from the insurgents. 37 Histories of the conflict repeatedly point to the effectiveness of these SAS teams as a significant contributing factor in the ALN's inability to use the small villages (mechtas and douars) as operational and supply bases for launching major operations.
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Populace Control by Quadrillage
As either a CMO or combat operation, histories of the War of National Liberation almost uniformly reference the successes achieved in securing rural areas through application of the French Army's concept of quadrillage. 39 Under this concept, implemented in 1956, soldiers (separate from the SAS) were dispersed throughout the countryside in demarcated zones with the goal of not only securing and defending specific locations, but also of conducting rapid and decisive sweeps with patrols to kill or capture fleeing insurgents. 40 While quadrillage was conceptually viable as a tool to cordon, secure, and then search terrain, it achieved its greatest success when the Army's leadership deemphasized static operations, created a reserve, increased mobility, and reoriented the "garrison mentality" of troops and commanders. 41 In conjunction with military operations to exploit the quadrillage concept, additional "pacified zones" were established around military objectives. 
Populace Control by Regroupement
As previously noted, part of the implementation of quadrillage required the relocation or regroupement of a significant number of indigenous persons. The underlying notion of the colonial government and the military was that the best way to protect the loyal elements of the indigenous population was to relocate them. Further, a regroupement of disloyal and uncommitted persons would, using the phraseology of Mao, accomplish the goal of "emptying the water away from the fish" in order to deny the insurgents refuge and supplies. In many cases, this facet of regroupement became divorced from operational objectives and seemingly became nothing more than an application of "the principle of collective responsibility to villages . 
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At the start of the insurrection, despite their recent counterinsurgency experience in Indochina, the French Army reverted to classic TTPs of establishing strongpoints in insurgent territory, sending out strong patrols along roadways, and conducting large-scale cordon and search operations. 57 As counterinsurgency experience increased, the French Army took a more nuanced approach to combat operations. Examples of the more nuanced TTPs include the application of the quadrillage concept, employment of paramilitaries, and establishment of the Morice Line. All of these TTPs had roots in the French Army's experience in Indochina.
Morice Line
Recognizing a critical requirement to cut off outside support to the insurgency, the French Army expended tremendous resources of men and materiel to create a cordon sanitaire along the entire Tunisian border. 58 The primary instrument for sealing the Tunisian border was a 200 mile long system of defenses in-depth named the Morice Line in honor of the Minister of
Defense. This line of defense included: electrified wire, minefields, ground radar; pre-registered indirect fires, strong points, and mobile response teams (both vehicular and heliborne).
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Supporting the Morice Line were 80,000 French troops to include elite mechanized, armored, and "para" units. 60 The mobility of these forces allowed immediate response to any attack, containment of any breaches, and effective deterrence to attempts to flank the Line. 61 Though the insurgents repeatedly attacked at a great cost in lives and materiel, both for the purpose of transit and to force engagement with the French forces, the Morice Line proved extremely effective at achieving its stated goals. 62 A similar cordon sanitaire was established along the Moroccan border, but it was neither as extensively developed as the Morice Line, nor did the insurgents assault it to the same extent. 63 Finally, the land based cordon sanitaire was complemented by naval and air interdiction efforts that sealed off the Mediterranean as an avenue for resupply.
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Direct Military Operations
The French Army never neglected direct engagement of insurgent forces, even while other, somewhat indirect, approaches to counterinsurgency were ongoing. With up to 400,000 troops on the ground, not counting police and paramilitaries, the French Army had significant forces for conducting a full range of operations. 65 Small-scale ambushes conducted at the platoon and company level, as well as major ambushes conducted with several regiments, were repeatedly undertaken to destroy the insurgents as they traveled through the rural areas. 66 The history of the war is also replete with examples of French Army operations to destroy insurgent sanctuaries and to directly target insurgent forces in the field. 67 This is especially true after initiation of the Challe plan that modified the quadrillage concept in order to release additional forces for offensive operations. 68 With these additional forces the French Army was able to conduct multiple, major operations driving deep into the insurgent territory to destroy the insurgents' internal bases of operations 69 Another critical factor in the success of these operations was the priority French forces placed on pursuit of insurgents after completion of raids and major operations. 70 Planned combat operations also leveraged the successful establishment of the cordon sanitaire along the borders. After establishing the Morice Line to stop border transit, the French Army then conducted sequenced tactical actions to drive the ALN from west to east against it. 71 The overall effectiveness of the French Army in conducting these combat operations forced the ALN to abandon its efforts to engage the French Army directly or to attack and hold population centers. From 1957, the insurgents were generally limited to small-scale raids and ambushes.
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Paramilitaries
The French government provided tremendous manpower to combat the insurgency, but the French Army recognized almost immediately that it would need auxiliary formations like militias or paramilitaries. Such forces would be needed to both augment the regular forces and effectively combat the insurgents through offensive operations. By early 1956, regulations for the establishment of paramilitaries were in place. 73 While colons and French clandestine organizations, established by both the military and colonial administration, set up extensive, unofficial militias for roughly parallel purposes, the officially formed paramilitaries merit primary attention.
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Throughout the countryside, with a specific goal of supporting the French garrisons, the
French Army established paramilitary units composed of indigenous troops variously known as
harkis (offensive units under French Army control) and "moghazi" or "maghzen" (lightly armed, and primarily defensive units under Bureau of Algerian Affairs control). The persons chosen to man the harkis were selected for their ability to provide intelligence on the local populace and knowledge of terrain. 75 The French entrusted these units, with an estimated strength of 160,000 combatants, with the missions of attacking the guerrillas and their supply networks, as well as occupying and defending set locations (e.g., villages). 76 The offensive capabilities of the harkis came to the fore as targets for conventional operations became less apparent. 77 Especially noteworthy were units of harkis comprised of a homogenous tribal or ethnic group and brought as a whole into the French counterinsurgency by their leaders. 78 The tribal and ethnic aspects of the harkis did not occur by happenstance; the primary proponent for the formation of these units was a French ethnographer. 79 While the value and reliability of harkis units varied, they were generally regarded as a true success. Factors that contributed to the success of the harkis include: appropriate missions (e.g., defense of villages); issuing weapons that were both appropriate to the assigned mission and familiar to the paramilitaries (e.g., shotguns); basing the combatants near their homes; knowledge of the operating area; good pay, treatment, and living conditions; integration with the SAS that were conducting military civic action missions;
and strictly limiting rules of engagement (ROE) that provided legitimacy and indigenous popular support. 80 There are no indications that the French Army gave consideration to the post-war treatment of the harkis, and their fate was often ignominious. 81 The French Army also established Territorial Units (Unites Territoriales (UT)), Mobile
Security Groups (Garde Mobile), rural defense companies (Compangnies Auto-Defense Rurale)
and Protection Battalions (Battalions de Protection ) made up of part-time militiamen recruited from the ranks of the colons. 82 The largest of these paramilitaries, the UT, composed of up to 130,000 members, performed static security duties, and was commanded by French Army officers. 83 After the abortive coup d' etat of 1960, the UT was demobilized based on its support for the coup.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS -PSYOPS
Throughout the war the French Army recognized the value of PSYOPS. It created an exceptionally effective division to conduct these operations. 85 Specific training in psychological warfare was included at the counterinsurgency training center. 86 The overarching concept of their PSYOPS was that the "Muslim masses [were] neutral or uninvolved" to the "contagion"
[involvement with the insurgents] and needed to be "inoculated" against the insurgents.
87
Signature PSYOPS campaigns included support for elections, plebiscites, and events that discredited the legitimacy of the insurgents. The French were quick to publicize internecine rivalries between different factions of the insurgency, such as an early incident where FLN forces used a mosque as an abattoir to slaughter 300 people loyal to another group.
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ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
In Quadrillage, especially as modified by the Challe Plan's movement away from the earlier static approach, seems to offer the single best concept for the control of both terrain and a population during an insurgency. In its thorough coverage of the country, persistence, integration with CMO programs such as the SAS, and linkage with combat operations that directly attacked the insurgents, it provides a template that could be readily adapted to other counterinsurgency campaigns.
The cordon sanitaire as implemented by the Morice Line also bears consideration as a specific counterinsurgency TTP capable of achieving the interdependent goals of establishing internal and external security and defense. While most readily employed in a desert environment, the determined efforts to cut-off insurgent lines of communication not only significantly weakened the insurgents in the country, but also forced the insurgents to undertake repeated direct combat operations that were doomed to failure.
The most apparent limitations to implementation of either the quadrillage or cordon sanitaire concepts are the manpower, infrastructure, and logistical costs required to accomplish either mission. Added to these limitations are the difficulties inherent in securing any type of terrain that offers concealment (i.e., anything other than desert). While none of these limitations can be disregarded, they can be minimized through emerging technologies that were unavailable during the Algerian conflict and Vietnam. Further, to the extent these "costs of doing business" cannot be minimized, if they are accepted as inherent to a successful counterinsurgency, they may become drivers for a realistic appraisal of the costs and benefits of involvement in combating an insurgency.
The extent of the paramilitaries' integration into the French counterinsurgency and the duration of their association is remarkable. Both the paramilitaries drawn from the indigenous population and from the ranks of the colons provided effective augmentation to the French Army. However, the more significant of the two paramilitaries was the harkis. The significance of the harkis is based not only on the number of combatants they provided. It is also based on the extent that the harkis gave the French Army irreplaceable knowledge of the operational environment (e.g., the potential for cultural awareness, intelligence, and knowledge of the local terrain), and undercut perceptions that there was uniform popular support for the insurgents.
The ultimate abandonment by the French of the vast majority of the harkis and their subsequent fate provides an object lesson on the utilization of locally raised paramilitaries by an outside country. If an outside country endeavors to support a counterinsurgency, it must consider from the start the nature and extent of support (e.g., asylum) to be provided to members of locally raised militias, support personnel (e.g., translators), and their families if the counterinsurgency is unsuccessful.
No significant divergences between French Army combat operations and current areas of doctrinal emphasis were identified. As would be expected of a professional army with recent combat experience, the French Army aggressively conducted pursuits, ambushes, and operations to clear and hold terrain, as well as the defense of population centers. A cursory examination of the French Army's establishment of the Morice Line and quadrillage, especially as it was initially implemented, might lead to a conclusion that the French had a misplaced focus on the defense of terrain -a focus that would be contrary to U.S. Army doctrine. 92 6 Multiple explanations for the term "pied noir" are given in the literature. Some assert the label was given by the indigenous people who were amused by the traditional black shoes worn by the original colonists. Others assert that the designation was derisively applied by Frenchmen who looked down on the colonists whose feet became tanned while living in Algeria and wearing sandals that exposed their feet to the intense southern sun. See, Horne, footnote on 30. 7 The incident that occurred at Setif, Algeria, is often cited as the actual start of the Algerian rebellion, though active insurgency began almost 9 years later. On 8 May 1945, a date that was coincidentally also Victory in Europe Day ("VE Day"), violence against "colons" erupted in the predominantly Islamic populated town of Setif. Over 100 "colons" were killed and another 100 were injured or wounded. The way many of the "colons" were killed or raped and the subsequent mutilation of their corpses provoked an exceptionally brutal response directed at the indigenous population. 9 Marine Corps guidance on counterinsurgency is also relevant, but the addition of a second framework for analysis with the potential necessity to resolve inter-service conflicts in application of doctrine was beyond the scope of this research paper. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . has provided more current and specific guidance. and, Threats to HN IDAD. Threats may be specific, such as illicit drugs or terrorism, or they may be more general as in social unrest and instability. Identification of the root cause is key so that military activities in the FID plans may target longterm causes rather than short-term symptoms.
FM 3-07.22, paragraphs 1-34 and 1-38, succinctly addresses the concept:
A successful counterinsurgency results in the neutralization by the state of the insurgency and its effort to form a counter state. While many abortive insurgencies are defeated by military and police actions alone, if an insurgency has tapped into serious grievances and has mobilized a significant portion of the population, simply returning to the status quo may not be an option. Reform may be necessary, but reform is a matter for the state, using all of its human and material resources. Security forces are only one such resource. The response must be multifaceted and coordinated, yet states typically charge their security forces with "waging counterinsurgency." This the security forces cannot do alone. and, Counterinsurgency operations must balance elimination of grievances (that is, reform, to include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the insurgents.
The quadrillage process had been tried in Indochina with mixed results and was imposed in Algeria soon after the start of the rebellion. The program was essentially static and defensive, and it required extensive manpower. On the whole, the results obtained in Algeria were much better than in Indochina, in part because the French had by then greater experience with such programs and the terrain in Algeria was more favorable. 40 Alexander, 9. See also, O'Ballance, 64 and 131; and Shrader 45, who provides some insights into the logistical support challenges of support of the quadrillage. 41 As initially implemented, the quadrillage concept resulted in the garrisoning of large numbers of troops. This tactic resulted in large "no-go zones" throughout the countryside where insurgents were able to operate with impunity. This freedom of operations and movement allowed the insurgents to exercise control over the indigenous population and support operations with replacement supplies and manpower, undermine support for the government, and position forces for offensive operations. Subsequent French commanders, General Challe in particular, recognized the deficiencies in the quadrillage concept. General Challe directed aggressive actions to include: breaking down garrisons into small units (mirroring the size of rebel formations), constant patrolling into all areas of the country to destroy insurgent sanctuaries, mobile search and destroy missions (using heliborne and motorized ground transport), improved communications, airborne surveillance and support, synchronizing operations between sectors, and pragmatic small unit training in counterinsurgency. See 46 Horne, 220 -221, 338, and 341 (attempts to improve conditions in regroupement centers). O'Ballance, 126, 135, and 137, provides extensive details on the regroupement centers; with the regroupement of persons located near the Morice Line detailed at 118. In a footnote at 163, O'Ballance provides even higher numbers than Horne for the resettled persons: 1.5 million Algerian Moslems in regroupement centers, 11,000 Algerians in internment camps, and 500,000 Algerian Moslems displaced to shanty towns near the urban centers. Also see, Alexander, 21, asserting that "many French officers viewed the population resettlements as tactically counter-productive . . . ;" and 178 addressing the larger impact of the human tragedy occurring in the internment camps. 47 Horne, 339 and 343 (impact of world opinion). O'Ballance, 130, in a "déjà vu all over again" footnote discusses leaks by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of information relating to torture in the Algerian resettlement camps that is reminiscent of the recent ICRC release of information relating to U.S. treatment of detainees during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 50 Horne, 309.
51 O'Ballance, 152. 52 Alexander, Chapter 4 (Marie-Catherine and Paul Villatoux, Aerial Intelligence During the Algerian War). 53 Ibid., 6 -7. 54 A review of the use of torture by the French Army and the impact on the War of National Liberation are found at Horne, 117, 172, [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] 55 Alexander, 21, in the opening chapter of a collection of essays, states his and his coeditor's goal of examining France's military performance, and specifically identifies two detractors to the study of military operations in the Algerian War of Liberation. They specifically note that this topic "needs rescuing from the fixation of writers on two fascinating but distorting agendas" that are then identified as "the political interventionism of a small number of Army officers" and the divergence between the elite units and the regular units composed of reservists and conscripts. 56 Horne, 331, reports that General de Gaulle enjoined General Challe, on his appointment as Commander in Chief of French Forces in Algeria to achieve "undisputed mastery of the field" and not to permit, in political terms, an "untoward incident in which we [came] off worst." 57 O'Ballance, 51. 58 An excellent overview of the Morice Line is provided by Shrader at 206 -209, and Figure 7 .1 (a schematic of the Morice Line). Unlike many writers, Shrader never loses sight of the significant logistical requirements that were entailed in supporting the operation. 59 According to Horne, 230 and 263 -264, the barbed wire fence was 8 feet high and was charged with 5000 volts of electricity. The fence was augmented with barbed wire aprons and trip lines. A 50 yard wide anti-personnel minefield paralleled the fence. 60 Horne, 264. 61 Ibid., 265. 62 Horne, 230, 264 -265, 314, 321, 326, on the disastrous All Saints Day attack on the Morice Line. O'Ballance, 92, 117, 129, and 133, includes the detail that ALN fighters sought internment by the Tunisian government to avoid orders to assault the Morice Line. Shrader, 209 -221, includes a detailed analysis of several major engagements fought along the frontier.
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